Technical security assessment • November 2026

Security tested.
Evidence documented.

An evidence-based review of MailKeep MX's live deployment, covering email encryption, sender authentication, relay protections, administrator access, host hardening, malware filtering, monitoring, and backup resilience.

Production deployment37 documented checksOperator-assisted testingNot an independent certification
01 / Executive overview

Security posture at a glance

The assessment draws on command outputs, service responses, administrative settings, delivered-message authentication checks, external reachability tests and operational logs supplied during a hands-on review.

37Documented technical checks
25Directly verified checks
9Observed/configured or operator-confirmed
3Open / not tested
Assessment conclusion. Multiple important security controls were demonstrated to work in the tested scenarios, including unauthenticated SMTP relay denial, modern TLS connections, DNS authentication, administrator access restrictions, malicious-test-message rejection and encrypted remote administration. This is a point-in-time assessment, not a declaration that the product or host is free from vulnerabilities.
02 / Validated defenses

Controls backed by observable results

Mail encryption

TLS 1.3 in operation

SMTP submission, IMAPS and POP3S negotiated TLS 1.3 and AES-256-GCM in the tested connections.

Abuse prevention

Relay attempt rejected

An unauthenticated external-recipient attempt was refused with SMTP 554 5.7.1.

Identity

SPF / DKIM / DMARC pass

Published authentication records were resolved, and a delivered test email passed all three checks at Gmail.

Mail access

TLS required for login

IMAP advertised LOGINDISABLED before STARTTLS, and POP3 rejected a pre-TLS authentication attempt.

Administration

MFA + IP restriction

Passkey/MFA administrator sign-in succeeded. An unapproved cellular-origin administrator login was refused.

Malware defense

Threat test messages refused

Operational logs recorded two EICAR-signature test emails rejected before delivery.

03 / Scope and methodology

What was tested, and how

Evidence sources

  • OpenSSL SMTP, IMAP and POP3 protocol negotiations
  • SMTP command-level relay attempt without authentication
  • DNS TXT lookups and Gmail authentication results
  • Windows PowerShell firewall, RDP and service outputs
  • Remote workstation TCP reachability checks
  • MailKeep admin configuration screenshots and logs
  • ClamAV daemon PING, database version and virus logs
  • Backup listings and operator-reported configuration test

Assessment boundaries

  • Production, point-in-time, operator-assisted testing
  • No destructive test or full penetration test performed
  • No source-code review or independent exploit analysis
  • No full set of external vantage points or IPv6 coverage
  • Some UI settings are observed rather than independently enforced
  • No full recovery drill or backup immutability validation
  • Security conclusions apply only to the tested deployment and scenarios

Release context: MailKeep 0.2.32 was confirmed from a production CLI version response. A later MailKeep operational summary displayed 0.2.33; the newer version was not separately reverified via CLI in the supplied evidence. Assessment period: November 2026.

04 / Technical evidence register

37 documented security checks

“Verified” means a specific result was directly demonstrated. “Observed” means a setting or operational record was shown. “Configured” or “Operator confirmed” means the setup/test was reported, not independently challenged. “Open” and “Not tested” identify remaining gaps.

IDControl and evidenceDomainFindingQualification
T01SMTP STARTTLS negotiationPort 587 negotiated TLS 1.3 with AES-256-GCM; handshake captured using OpenSSL.Mail transportVerifiedHandshake from a client using TLS-inspecting antivirus; actual server certificate separately inspected.
T02SMTP certificate identityDirect server-side inspection showed a Let’s Encrypt certificate with mail.mailkeepmx.com in Subject Alternative Names; valid through February 19, 2027.Mail transportVerifiedComplete independent chain validation for every protocol remains outside scope.
T03Unauthenticated external relay attemptSMTP RCPT TO for an external recipient returned 554 5.7.1 Relay access denied, without SMTP AUTH or DATA.Mail transportVerifiedOne origin/sender/recipient scenario; not exhaustive relay testing.
T04SPF DNS publicationDomain TXT policy v=spf1 mx ~all was resolved.Domain authenticationVerifiedPublication alone is not delivery validation.
T05DKIM DNS publicationDKIM TXT public key found at mail._domainkey.mailkeepmx.com.Domain authenticationVerifiedKey size was not independently measured from full key.
T06DMARC DNS policyDMARC policy p=quarantine and aggregate reporting address resolved.Domain authenticationVerifiedReceiver policy application varies.
T07Real-world mail authenticationGmail Show Original reported SPF PASS, DKIM PASS, and DMARC PASS for a delivered message.Domain authenticationVerifiedApplies to the tested outgoing message.
T08IMAP plaintext-login advertisementPort 143 CAPABILITY included STARTTLS and LOGINDISABLED prior to authentication.Mail accessVerifiedNo live password was sent.
T09POP3 TLS enforcement responsePort 110 rejected an unauthenticated USER command with “Use STLS before sending a password”.Mail accessVerifiedA single authentication sequence was checked.
T10Implicit TLS on IMAPSPort 993 negotiated TLS 1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.Mail accessVerifiedClient antivirus intercepted certificate chain.
T11Implicit TLS on POP3SPort 995 negotiated TLS 1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.Mail accessVerifiedClient antivirus intercepted certificate chain.
T12Windows firewall enabledDomain, Private and Public profiles enabled; active default inbound action Block.Host and networkVerifiedPer-rule scope and upstream filtering assessed separately.
T13RDP Network Level AuthenticationNLA was enabled and a fresh RDP sign-in succeeded.Host and networkVerifiedRDP TLS certificate validation not separately reviewed.
T14Encrypted remote administrationTailscale-connected workstation established an RDP session to the server’s private VPN interface.Host and networkVerifiedTailnet policy administration and device posture not independently audited.
T15Public RDP reachabilityExternal connection attempt to the server’s public IPv4 RDP port failed after firewall hardening.Host and networkVerifiedVerified from one external workstation only, not every source/network.
T16Legacy FTP exposureBoth IIS FTP and FileZilla FTP Windows services were stopped and disabled.Host and networkVerifiedFirewall rules remain subject to future configuration changes.
T17Public database reachabilityFive identified SQL/Analysis Services/MongoDB candidate ports did not accept external TCP connections from the test workstation.Host and networkVerifiedA targeted port subset, not a full external port scan.
T18Local Windows password policyMinimum 14 characters, 12-password history, ten-failure lockout, 30-minute duration and reset window confirmed via net accounts.Host and networkVerifiedNew policy does not retroactively strengthen existing passwords.
T19Administrator MFA sign-inAdministrator completed a passkey/MFA sign-in after the mandatory administrator second-factor setting was enabled.AdministrationVerifiedEnforcement across every administrator account not separately sampled.
T20Administrator access allowlistApproved network reached the console; an unapproved cellular network received Forbidden.AdministrationVerifiedTested from two network origins; application-specific control.
T21Administrator password policyMailbox minimum set to 12 characters and admin minimum set to 16 in MailKeep.AdministrationConfiguredSaved configuration confirmed by operator; enforcement of new limits not live-tested.
T22IP-based sign-in bansFive-failure IP ban and one-hour duration visible in console; daily summary reported banned source IPs.AdministrationObservedBan bypass and rate limiting across all interfaces not fully tested.
T23Account lockout and alertingAccount lockouts, distributed-login alerts, location notifications and unknown-account detection shown enabled.AdministrationObservedAlert delivery, retention and tamper-resistance not comprehensively tested.
T24ClamAV scanning daemonclamd and freshclam Windows services running; localhost scanner returned native PONG.Malware defenseVerifiedService responsiveness is not a full scanner health audit.
T25Antivirus signature freshnessClamAV reported engine 1.5.4 and database 28190 dated November 20, 2026.Malware defenseVerifiedTime-bounded observation.
T26Real message malware rejectionMailKeep virus logs recorded two inbound EICAR-signature test messages refused before delivery.Malware defenseVerifiedHarmless EICAR test only, not representative of all malware.
T27Host antivirus responseMicrosoft Defender recorded detection of EICAR test file and ActionSuccess True.Malware defenseVerifiedIndependent ClamAV file test was intercepted by Defender.
T28Scanner outage behavior“Deliver if the virus scanner is down” disabled; legitimate inbound test message delivered afterward.Malware defenseConfiguredScanner outage was not deliberately induced; defer-on-outage untested.
T29Spam and phishing layersInbound spam filter, sender authentication checks, suspicious attachment extension blocking, link DNS lists and outgoing spam checks enabled in screenshots.Malware defenseObservedDetection rates and false positives were not measured.
T30Scheduled local backupsThree local backup generations visible; scheduled daily run at 02:00 shown.RecoveryObservedBackup age at time of evidence, not continuous monitoring.
T31Off-site backup replicationTwo off-site copies displayed in Backblaze B2, approximately 1.9 GB each.RecoveryObservedObject immutability and delete protection not assessed.
T32Backup configuration testMailKeep backup Test action reported working following operator execution.RecoveryOperator confirmedTest semantics not independently observed; no full restoration performed.
T33Restoration readinessDocumented restore workflow exists in the console.RecoveryNot testedA separate isolated restore exercise remains necessary.
T34Windows update statusServer 2019 reported security hotfixes installed in November 2026; no Component Based Servicing reboot-pending key.MaintenanceVerifiedNot a comprehensive vulnerability or pending-update scan.
T35Security operations visibilityMailKeep daily summary recorded unsuccessful sign-ins, geography rejections, account-guessing attempts and IP bans.MonitoringObservedAdmin setting-change audit coverage, tamper-resistance and alert delivery untested.
T36Operational anomaly reviewDaily summary reported one sign-in stopped by two-factor after a correct password, requiring attribution.MonitoringOpenMay be legitimate; not proof of compromise.
T37Multi-service attack surfaceHost runs MailKeep alongside IIS, web apps and SQL services; shared-host hardening remains to be assessed.Host and networkOpenPotential lateral-movement paths and privilege separation not penetration-tested.
05 / Operational resilience

Defense in depth beyond the mail protocol

Administrator and network boundary

Remote Desktop administration was moved to a private Tailscale connection. An external workstation could no longer establish a TCP session to the public RDP endpoint following firewall changes. Administrator access was additionally tested against an allowlist, with a disallowed cellular-origin request refused.

These checks do not establish that all public sources are blocked or that the host has been fully penetration-tested.

Backups and recovery

Daily local backups and two Backblaze B2 off-site copies were visible. The backup feature includes mail, accounts and settings according to the interface. The operator reported that the built-in Test action succeeded.

The off-site history displayed only two versions. No isolated end-to-end restoration or immutable backup protection was demonstrated.

Threat monitoring

The daily operational summary reported rejected authentication attempts, source-IP bans, country-based access denials and a correct-password attempt stopped by two-factor authentication. The control data indicates active detection and response; the latter event should be reviewed for attribution rather than treated as proof of compromise.

06 / Findings and improvement roadmap

Items still requiring attention

07 / Assurance statement

Transparent, evidence-based security reporting

Assurance limitation. This document is an operator-assisted technical security assessment of a specific MailKeep MX deployment, prepared from supplied test outputs and screenshots. It is not a third-party penetration-test report, SOC 2 attestation, ISO 27001 certification, security warranty, or proof that all vulnerabilities have been eliminated.

Testing can demonstrate that particular defenses function under specified conditions; it cannot establish that a system is “fully secure.” Controls and infrastructure should be retested after significant updates and periodically thereafter.